The Effect on Social Welfare of Asymmetric Mobile Termination Rate 


Vol. 37,  No. 6, pp. 453-463, Jun.  2012


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  Abstract

The Effect of asymmetric interconnection charge is different between where the retail price of incumbent is regulated and that of incumbent is not regulated. When the retail price of incumbent is not regulated, the brand loyalty and the relative magnitude of each marginal cost determine the effect of consumer surplus. However, when the retail price of incombent is regulated, network substitution effect also plays a important role to the consumer surplus. The higher the brand loyalty, the lower the network substitution effect, or the higher the marginal cost of the entrant, the social welfare through the asymmetric interconnection charge is more increased. In the other cases, the consumer surplus might be decreased.

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  Cite this article

[IEEE Style]

C. Jung, S. Jung, J. Lee, "The Effect on Social Welfare of Asymmetric Mobile Termination Rate," The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences, vol. 37, no. 6, pp. 453-463, 2012. DOI: .

[ACM Style]

Choong-young Jung, Song-Min Jung, and Jong-yong Lee. 2012. The Effect on Social Welfare of Asymmetric Mobile Termination Rate. The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences, 37, 6, (2012), 453-463. DOI: .

[KICS Style]

Choong-young Jung, Song-Min Jung, Jong-yong Lee, "The Effect on Social Welfare of Asymmetric Mobile Termination Rate," The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences, vol. 37, no. 6, pp. 453-463, 6. 2012.